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Recent Developments 
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Glendening 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the 
Attorney General, upon obtaining 
the approval of the Board of Public 
Works, has the power to enter into 
contingency fee contracts with 
private law firms to secure 
representation for the State of 
Maryland. Philip Morris, Inc. v. 
Glendening, 349 Md. 660, 709 
A.2d 1230 (1998). The Attorney 
General may deduct a percentage 
of the money recovered by the 
state in litigation, and use that 
percentage as a contingency fee 
payment to a private law firm, 
without offending Maryland 
statutory law or constitutional 
principles concerning legislative 
appropriation. The court also 
ruled that contingency fee 
contracts in which private law 
firms have a financial interest in 
the outcome of state litigation do 
not violate due process or public 
policy. In so deciding, the court 
extended to the Attorney General 
the ability to secure contingency 
fee based representation for 
tobacco litigation. 
The Attorney General of 
Maryland entered into a 
contingency fee contract 
("contract") with a private law 
firm ("outside counsel") to secure 
representation for the State of 
Maryland in tort litigation against 
tobacco manufacturers. The 
purpose of the litigation was to 
seek reimbursement for the State 
Treasury for past tobacco-related 
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amount of state financial resources 
and personnel that would be 
necessary for successful litigation, 
coupled with the wealthy and 
powerful nature of tobacco 
companies, the Attorney General 
determined that this was an 
extraordinary situation and that 
outside counsel was necessary for 
successful litigation. The resulting 
contract with outside counsel 
provided for a twenty-five percent 
contingency fee to be paid to 
outside counsel from any money 
recovered by the state. The 
Attorney General sought and 
obtained the express written 
approval of the State Board of 
Public Works for the contingency 
fee contract. 
Philip Morris, Inc., ("Philip 
Morris") one of the defendants, 
challenged the contract in the 
Circuit Court for Talbot County 
contending that the Attorney 
General lacked the authority to 
enter into the contract with outside 
counsel. Both Philip Morris and 
the Attorney General moved for 
summary judgment. The trial 
court denied Philip Morris' motion 
and ruled in favor of the Attorney 
General. Philip Morris appealed to 
the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland, but before the court 
could consider the case, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland issued a 
writ of certiorari sua sponte. 
The court of appeals began its 
analysis by examining the powers 
granted to the Attorney General by 
the Maryland Constitution and the 
enactments of the General 
Assembly of Maryland. Philip 
Morris, 349 Md. at 674-75, 709 
A.2d at 1237 (citing State v. 
Burning Tree Club, 301 Md. 9,32, 
481 A.2d 785, 797 (1984)). 
Among these powers, the court 
stated that, "the Attorney General, 
with the written approval of the 
Governor, may employ any 
assistant counsel that the Attorney 
General considers necessary to 
carry out any duty of the office in 
an extraordinary or unforeseen 
case." Id. at 675, 709 A.2d at 
1237. (citing MD. CODE ANN., 
STATE GOV'T § 6-105 (1997)). 
The court noted that the Attorney 
General and the Governor had 
determined that the tobacco 
litigation fell within the meaning 
of an "extraordinary" case, based 
on the nature of the litigation. Id. 
at 676, 709 A.2d at 1238. The 
court concluded that because 
Maryland law gives the Attorney 
General discretion to determine 
29.1 U. Bait. L.F. 67 
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whether a case is extraordinary 
under section 6-1 05(b), the court 
must accept the Attorney 
General's determination of the 
need for outside counsel. Id. at 
678, 709 A.2d at 1239. (citing 
United States v. George S. Bush & 
Co., 310 U.S. 371 (1940)). The 
court cautioned, however, that it is 
not clear whether state funds 
. recovered from litigation could 
compensate outside counsel 
pursuant to a contingency fee 
contract. Id. at 679, 709 A.2d at 
1239. Although the court found 
no statutory prohibition in section 
6-1 05(b) on the ability of the 
Attorney General to enter into such 
a contract, the issue of 
constitutionality was more 
complicated. Id. at 680-81, 709 
A.2d at 1240. The focus was 
therefore shifted to whether the 
contingency fee arrangement 
violated the Maryland Constitution 
prohibition against the payment of 
state funds without legislative 
appropriation. Id. at 681, 709 
A.2d at 1240. (citing MD. CONST. 
art. III, § 32). Pursuant to section 
6-213 of the State Finance and 
Procurement Article of the 
Annotated Code of Maryland, the 
Attorney General is required to 
deposit recovery money into the 
state treasury within one month of 
its receipt. Id. After deposit, the 
state money may not be withdrawn 
to pay a contingency fee unless 
there is a legislative appropriation 
authorizing the withdrawal. Id. 
(quoting Dorsey v. Petrott, 178 
Md. 230, 13 A.2d 630 (1940)). 
There were no provisions made by 
the state for the appropriation of 
29.1 U. Bait. L.F. 68 
the contingency fee because the 
contract allocated the contingency 
fee out of the gross settlement, 
before any money was deposited 
into the State Treasury. Id. at 666-
67, 709 A.2d at 1233. The issue 
then became when the recovery 
becomes state funds; at 
disbursement or upon deposit into 
the state treasury. Id. at 682, 709 
A.2d at 1241. 
The court resolved the 
appropnatIon issue by 
distinguishing between money 
already deposited into the state 
treasury and a gross settlement that 
has yet to be deposited. Id. 
According to the court, Article III 
section 32 of the Maryland 
Constitution does not apply to the 
gross settlement recovered from 
litigation. Id. Therefore, money 
may be taken from the gross 
settlement before it must be 
deposited into the State Treasury. 
Id. The court reasoned that since 
the contract specifically provided 
that the state would not collect any 
money from the lawsuit until 
outside counsel had received their 
contingency fee, the contingency 
fee money did not constitute state 
funds subject to legislative 
appropriation until the state had 
fulfilled its obligations under the 
contract. Id. The court reserved 
the determination of whether the 
Attorney General has the power 
under section 6-1 05(b) to enter 
into a contingency fee contract 
without the approval of the State 
Board of Public Works. Id. at 681, 
709 A.2d at 1240. It was not at 
issue in this case since the 
Attorney General had the express 
consent of the Board of Public 
Works.ld. 
The court then moved on to 
discuss the secondary issues of due 
process and public policy and how 
they affect the ability of outside 
counsel to work on behalf of the 
state in a case in which they have a 
financial stake. Id. at 684, 709 
A.2d at 1242. The court 
determined that due process does 
not necessarily preclude an 
attorney from representing the 
state in cases in which they have a 
financial stake. Id. at 687-88, 709 
A.2d at 1243. (citing Marshall v. 
Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238 (1980) 
(finding that State administrators 
do not need to be completely 
detached and neutral in an 
adversarial system.)) The court 
thus determined that outside 
counsel's financial interest in the 
tobacco litigation was within 
reasonable limits, given the 
holding of the Supreme Court in 
Marshall. Id. at 688, 709 A.2d at 
1244. 
The court's holding in the 
instant case permIttmg the 
Attorney General to enter into 
contingency fee contracts with 
private law firms is consistent with 
Maryland law, public policy, and 
due process. Given the nature of 
current tobacco litigation, the 
court's ruling is beneficial to the 
State of Maryland because it will 
ensure that the litigation receives 
the attention it deserves. This 
case, however, constitutes a large 
setback to the tobacco companies 
involved in both current and future 
litigation. Had the court ruled that 
the State's contingency fee 
contract was unauthorized, a 
tobacco company's extensive 
financial resources would have 
given it a distinct advantage over 
the low funding and high workload 
of the Attorney General's office. 
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